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Abstract 
A value for money (VFM) assessment allows public policy makers to determine which procurement, 
between traditional or public-private partnerships, is better to procure for a specific project. Although the 
government of Vietnam has established a large number of PPP projects since first announcing its desire for 
private participation in 1993, the government has never carried out an evaluation of the “economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness” of PPPs over traditional public procurement. This paper proposes a value for 
money methodology to evaluate whether decisions to pursue a PPP creates good value for the Vietnamese 
government. A case study in Vietnam (Phu My project) is applied to examine the reliability of the method. 
The result of research reveals that there is a 84.9 % confidence level that a PPP model may not be a better 
option for procurement in the Phu My project. In addition, vehicle tolls and the inflation from 2016-2034 
have had the largest impact on the case’s value for money. 
Keywords: Value for money (VFM), Public-private partnership (PPP), Public sector comparator (PSC), 
Shadow bid price (SBP). 
 
Introduction 
During the past two decades, public-private partnership (PPP) has become an important alternative to traditional 
procurement to develop new road projects in Vietnam. One of the reasons the government of Vietnam pursues 
PPP to provide road infrastructure is due to budget constraints to finance such projects, where state resources are 
not enough to satisfy demand. The term PPP has been identified in accordance with different approaches to 
defining PPP. PPP could be defined as a range of possible relationships among public and private entities in the 
context of infrastructure and other services (Asian Development Bank, henceforth, ADB 2008). 
Paralleling with development of PPP projects, several evaluation tools to support PPPs decision-making 
have been investigated, such as the cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
and the value for money assessment. According to Contreras (2014), “CBA and CGE techniques try to answer 
the question of whether there are better uses for public resources, but they do not look at the different ways of 
procuring a given project. By contrast, Value for Money (VFM) analysis tries to find the optimal way to supply 
a given service, once it has been decided that the service must be provided either directly by the public sector or 
through a PPP scheme” (Contreras 2014, p. 94). According to U.S Department of Transportation (2012, p. 1-2), 
value for money is defined as “the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for 
purpose) of the good or service to meet the user’s requirements”. Given the definition, as well as previous 
studies, there are two kinds of VFM approaches that include quantitative and qualitative VFM assessment. The 
first involves comparing the whole cost of a project if conducted as PPP procurement and traditional 
procurement (World Bank 2013; Murray 2006; Infrastructure Ontario 2007; D. Marollas et al 2009). The second 
is associated with checking the fitness of procurements through evaluation criteria (WB 2013; C. Contreras 2014, 
KDI 2010; D.Morallos et all. 2009). However, for the last decade, quantitative value for money analysis has 
been utilized more widely as an efficient evaluation method of PPPs in many countries around the world, for 
example UK, US, Australia, Korea, and Canada among others. 
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Since first announcing its desire to encourage private participation in 1993, more than 53 projects were 
developed under PPP in Vietnam, but application of VFM assessment in Vietnam to support PPP decision 
making is unlikely to be mentioned. Moreover, recently 6 PPP projects among 53 have been reverting from the 
private sector to the public sector despite the concession term still being active, accounting for about 11% of 
total projects. This figure is not large, but it is high time for the Vietnamese government to consider and evaluate 
the efficiency of PPPs, because failure of a PPP project could have a negative impact on both economics as well 
as society. One of the most pressing concerns of the Vietnamese government is how to encourage private 
participation and how much investment capital could be mobilized from the private sector in the absence of 
assessing whether a PPP model is appropriate to procure public projects. 
 The aim of this research is to cover the quantitative VFM approach to evaluate a PPP model via studying 
the case of a particular project in Vietnam. The paper begins with a summary of quantitative VFM methodology, 
including definition and structure. The second part describes the case study to be applied for the research. Third, 
the paper discusses the main findings from the results. Lastly, it provides some recommendations on the 
selection of the most suitable forms of procurement to finance the case study. 
 
Review of quantitative value for money methodology 
Quantitative VFM definition 
World Bank (2013) defined quantitative VFM as that which “involves comparing the value for money of a proposed 
PPP (or actual bids received) with a ‘Public Sector Comparator’ (PSC)—that is, a model of the project if implemented 
through traditional public procurement” (WB 2013, p. 14). Once again, D. Marollas et al. (2009, p. 30) emphasized, 
“the quantitative VFM component includes all project factors that can be valued in monetary terms. It features a 
methodology that compares the PPP bid with a hypothetical scenario called the public-sector comparator (PSC)”.  
According to the above definitions, quantitative VFM can be understand as the comparison of the costs 
of a project via the public sector and via a PPP, which can be illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of PSC and PPP bids (Adapted from D. Marollas et al. 2009) 
 
VFM is produced when the value of PSC is larger than the value of a PPP. In the other words, if quantitative 
VFM is positive, private investors should carry out the project. In contrast, the project should be conducted by 
the public sector if the indicator is negative. Actually, VFM is to compare the governments’ spending between 
PPP schemes and conventional procurement. 
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Quantitative VFM structure 
Public-Sector Comparator cost 
“PSC estimates the hypothetical risk-adjusted cost if a project were to be financed, owned and implemented 
solely by the public agency” (Partnerships Victoria 2001, p. 6). Although most countries create PSC-PPP 
comparisons in their own way, components of PSC seem to be similar. According to the Australian style PSC-
PPP comparison, the components of PSC include raw cost, transferable risk, retained risk, and competitive 
neutrality. Meanwhile, PSC in the Canadian style PSC-PPP comparison consists of capital cost, operating cost, 
risk, tax and optimism bias. However, raw cost of Australian PSC can be similar to capital cost and operating 
cost of the Canadian PSC. Likewise, competitive neutrality in PSC of Australia is considered as tax in PSC of 
Canada. Transferable risk, retained risk in Australia, means risk and optimism bias in Canada. Basically, there 
are four main components in PSC, including: retained risks, transferable risks, competitive neutrality, and raw 
PSC. 
Raw PSC means that whole life cycle costs of a public project, including direct cost and indirect cost 
relevant to construction, operation and maintenance. Competitive neutrality is to remove any net competitive 
advantages that accrue to a government business by virtue of its public ownership (Victoria department of 
Treasury 2001). Transferable risks means risks that would transfer from the public sector to the selected private 
investors (Infrastructure Ontario 2007). “The value of transferable risks in a PSC measures the cost the 
government could expect to pay for that risk over the term of the project in a public procurement scenario” (D. 
Morallos et al 2009, p. 31). Retained risks means that an evaluation of the cost of risks that government expects 
to retain if the project is conducted under PPP (Grimsey, D & Lewis, M. K 2005)  
 
Valuing risk 
Basically, the risks in PSC are often valuated before classification into transferable and retained risks (D. 
Morallos et al. 2009). Generally, the process of risk valuation in VFM comprises four main steps, which is 
illustrated by Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Steps to risk valuation (Adapted from Victoria department of Treasury. 2001; Infrastructure Ontario. 2007) 
Discount rate  
Step 1: Identify 
the project risks 
*Identify all risks 
for a project 
*Identify which 
risks are material 
when aggregated 
Step 2: Quantify 
consequences of 
each risk 
*Identify 
consequences of 
each risk 
eventuating 
*Consider timing 
issues 
*Record 
assumptions 
made 
 
Step 3: Estimate 
probability of each 
risk eventuating 
*Estimate 
probability of 
occurrence of each 
risk 
*Record 
assumptions made 
 
Step 4: Calculate 
value of risk 
*Value of each 
risk = base costs 
x probability of 
occurrence of the 
risk x impact of 
the risk. 
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When computing the whole life-cycle cost of a project, it is necessary to compare revenue and costs in different 
times. “A discount rate is used to convert projected cash flows into a present value to enable comparison of 
competing options for which the cash flows reflect differences in PPP timing and amounts” (Infrastructure 
Australia 2013, p. 8). “A discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis allows a public agency to develop a net present 
value (NPV) for revenues and costs (including costs of risks) that are not expected to occur until far into the 
future” (US department of transport 2012, p. 3-1). There are three common kinds of approaches to calculate 
discount rate including (1) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (2) Risk-Free Rate (3) A single discount rate.  
 CAPM: “the cost of capital reflects the return required by an investor to undertake or invest in a 
particular project. The required return is equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk premium for the systematic risks 
retained by the investor” (Partnership Victoria 2003, p. 2).  
Risk-Free Rate: “This approach uses the public sector's long-term borrowing rate if the project risks are 
reflected in the project cash flows”. (US department of transport 2012, p.3-3) 
A single discount rate: “which may be project or sector specific, could be used for PPP the PSC and the PPP 
without adjusting for the risks a public sector would acquire in the PSC (traditional procurement) option” (D. 
Morallos 2009, p. 30) 
Basically, according to the traditional approach, PSC is the total net present value of four components, 
including raw PSC, competitive neutrality, transferred risk, and retained risk. However, the potential weakness 
of the PSC accounting approach is lack of explicit inclusion of the cost consideration. According to Tsukada 
(2015, p. 8), “allocation of government funds to an infrastructure project entails opportunity costs to nations 
because these funds would no longer be available for other purposes”. Therefore, cost of financing should be 
reflected in the PSC calculation. The revised formula of the PSC is identified, as follows (Tsukada 2015): 
 
PSC = transferable risks + retained risks + competitive neutrality + financing cost + raw project - Future revenue 
 
PPP cost  
Adjusted Shadow Bidding (ASB) represents the cost of a project if implemented by PPPs, which is the PPP bid. 
According to traditional accounting, ASB is comprised of opex, capex, financing cost, and retained risks. 
However, ignoring the return on investment computation in the ASB could lead to misguided decision-making 
when selecting the best procurement form. In addition, Tsukada (2015) questioned the validity of including the 
retained risk in the cost of PPP shadow biding practices. The basic assertion of Tsukada (2015) is that a bid price 
should be estimated by a shadow bid price in accordance with the practices likely to be adopted by the private 
sector. It should be noted that the private sector does not incorporate retained risk in their formation of a bid 
price. The modified formula of the shadow bid price (SBP) for a PPP project is as follows (Tsukada 2015): 
 
SBP = Capital expenditure + operating expense + financing cost + return on investment (profit) - future revenue 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
This research uses sensitivity analysis to compute simulations of project’s VFM due to the effect of changes in 
cost components. There are two kinds of sensitivity analysis implemented in this research, including simple 
sensitivity analysis and advanced sensitivity analysis. Simple sensitivity analysis is to compute effects of 
movements of PSC cost components on the quantitative VFM through the point estimation. Meanwhile, 
advanced sensitivity analysis is to measure random uncertainty of cost components influence on VFM of the 
project. Monte Carlo simulation is applied to generate distributions of simulation VFM. 
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Case study application of quantitative VFM assessment 
The proposed quantitative VFM approach is applied to Phu My bridge in Vietnam. Phu My is one of the PPP 
projects being criticized strongly in Vietnam because of its inefficiency. The project was planned for completion 
in 2005 with a concession time of 29 years. However, after a short time of operation the project was reverted 
again to the public sector in 2014. According to the concessioners, one of the reasons leading to the inefficiency 
of the project was that the construction cost was over the forecast. Meanwhile, the actual revenue from the 
operation of the project was lower than the forecast, which did not cover the expenses. The main argument for 
this problem centers on whether the project should have been pursued through a PPP scheme as originally 
planned, or if it should have been repossessed back to the public sector as the Vietnamese government has done. 
 
Background of the project 
The Phu My Bridge is located in Ho Chi Minh City, and spans across the Saigon River. Its length is 2.4 km and 
its width is 27.5 m with 6 lanes, linking District 2 and District 7 of the city. The objective of the project is to 
eliminate traffic congestion and travel time on roads in corridor 2, and congestion in urban areas of Ho Chi Minh 
City. In addition to this, the bridge is expected to contribute to the development of the economy in District 2, 
District 9, District 7, and other neighborhood districts. The project was planned to start in December 2005 and be 
operational by January 2009. It was to be transferred to the government of Vietnam in 2034. 
The Vietnam Road Administration, on behalf of the Ministry of Transportation, monitors the quality of the 
construction and implementation. The People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh City (local government) acts on 
behalf of the Vietnamese Government to sign contracts with the Phu My PPP Company (PMC), which is called a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV). The Ministry of Finance has become a guarantor for long-term loans from 
financial organizations, including BIDV, Sacombank and Société Générale. The PMC is responsible for 
coordinating between private investors and banks, besides, collecting tolls from users. 
 
The key features of the Phu My case are as follows: 
Location: Ho Chi Minh City 
Length of bridge: 2.4 Km (4 lanes) 
Owner’s equity contributed investment is 30% of total capital. 
Construction cost: 1,806,523 million VND (2005) 
Construction duration: 4 years (2005 to 2009) 
Operation period: 26 years (2009 to 2034) 
 
Findings and discussions 
Basic assumption for assessment 
In order to carry out the quantitative VFM analysis, it is essential to identify two components, including PSC and 
SBP. PSC represents the whole cost of project according to the perspective of the government, while SBP is 
regarded as the whole cost of the project if implemented as a PPP scheme. 
 
The government financing in PSC 
It is hypothesized that the Phu My project could have been constructed by the public sector if the government 
issued government bonds to finance project. The financing cost is suggested to compute by applying the interest 
rate of long-term Vietnam national bonds. According to the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance (2005), the interest 
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rate of a fifteen-year government bond was 8.6%, so the same rate is utilized to compute the financing cost of 
PSC in the case study of the Phu My project. An 8.6% interest rate is assumed to be unchanged during the period 
of the concession.    
 
Revenue in PSC 
The estimate of revenue of the PSC would be based on the user fees, which depends on the traffic demand and 
level of toll fees. Due to the lack of information on revenue leakage, and other relevant data, the traffic volume 
of the PSC is assumed to be equal with the PPP case. The level of the project toll depends on the Circular No 
90/2004/TT-BTC of the Vietnamese Ministry of Finance. 
 
Setting discount rates 
Discount rates play an important role in quantitative VFM assessments. In order to calculate the net present cost 
of the project followed by traditional procurement, a 8.6% interest rate of long-term government bonds would be 
used to discount the cash flow of the whole life. Regarding discounting cash flow of SBP, the discount rate is 
considered by applying WACC. Once again, the impact of inflation of each component in PSC and SBP should 
to be considered in order to change from the real price of cash flows to a nominal price when computing the 
present value of PSC and SBP. In this research, actual domestic inflation, which is applied for the project from 
2005-2015 based on the World Economic Outlook Database of IMF (2015) and a forecasted at 5% inflation rate, 
is applied for this project from 2016-2034 based on the forecast of the IMF (2015).  
 
Quantification risk 
In project procurement, there are many risks related either the public sector or private sector. Based on a review 
of the existing literature, there are three key groups: risks in development phase, risks in construction phase and 
risks in operation phase. More specifically, there are 17 factor-risks that affect projects. However, construction-
cost-overrun risk and traffic-volume risk have the strongest impact on the cash flow of projects (Gil, 2013; Kim, 
2008, Moneim, 2008, C.O Cruz, 2012). Once again, the studies of Luu V.T. et al (2009) conducing the survey 
from infrastructures experts demonstrated that construction overruns is one of the main risks that occurs 
frequently in the construction environment in Vietnam. Due to the historical observation of risks involving 
infrastructure projects as well as empirical studies regarding risks in Vietnam are very few, it is assumed that 
there are two kinds of risk associated with construction-cost-overrun risk and traffic-volume risk. 
 
Construction overrun cost risk 
The value of construction cost overrun risk is estimated by applying the mean of construction cost overrun, 
probability of occurrence of risk and construction cost of the project. Identifying the probability distribution 
function (PDF) of construction cost overrun requires a large raw source of data. Regarding the probability 
distribution function, having run 167 road projects in general, the results of Sailing K.B (2008) justified that 
Gamma distribution fit well for costs overrun. Therefore, the research hypothesizes probability distribution of 
construction cost overrun of Vietnamese road projects follows Gamma distribution. Through the historical data 
from projects completed from 2003 to 2015 in Vietnam, the mean value of construction cost overrun is estimated 
at 11.66%, standard deviation is 6.64%. 
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Figure 3: The Probability Distribution Function (PDF) for construction cost overrun ratio 
 
Traffic risk 
In terms of the traffic volume, value of risk is calculated by applying the mean of traffic volume, probability of 
occurrence of risk and first-year revenue in the period of operation of the project. Through running 183 road 
projects in general, Sailling K.B (2008) demonstrated that Pert distribution fit well for traffic volume risk. Based 
on the historical data from road projects operated from 2010 to 2015 in Vietnam and application of Pert 
distribution, the traffic volume inaccuracy of road projects in Vietnam is -12,17% with standard deviation of 
24,28% 
 
Figure 4: The Probability Distribution Function (PDF) for traffic volume 
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Calculation of shadow bid price (SBP) 
Items Value 
Capex  1,806,523 million VND* 
Opex 1,097,450 million VND* 
Equity  30% 
Debt  70% 
Cost of debt  10 % 
Cost of equity  7.25 % 
Corporate tax 28 % 
WACC  7.21 % 
Concession term 29 years 
Table 1: Financial indicators of Phu My case (Source: T.V Hoang & X.N. Thanh 2013) 
*VND (Vietnamese Dong) = 0.00005 USD 
 
 
Unit: million VNDs 
Year 
Capital 
 
expenditure 
Operation  
expense 
Financing  
cost 
Return on  
investment Revenue 
SBP  
Nominal  
 price NPV 
2005 745,779   26,290     834,670 778,537.16 
2006 446,955   72,212     593,034 515,951.96 
2007 359,279   110,607     564,217 457,867.94 
2008 254,510   141,617     537,242 406,657.81 
2009   4,504 655,645 9,359 41,650 630,826 445,382.27 
2010   5,093 224,830 9,359 47,097 196,319 129,285.51 
2011   5,774 242,968 9,359 53,395 211,346 129,821.82 
2012   15,618 262,327 9,359 144,438 163,884 93,897.40 
2013   17,710 276,091 9,359 163,787 165,946 88,684.66 
2014   20,141 289,611 9,359 186,265 165,131 82,314.43 
2015   22,891 302,612 9,359 211,696 161,170 74,936.97 
2016   26,394 314,812 9,359 244,096 153,799 66,700.84 
2017   36,084 325,573 9,359 333,713 107,049 43,303.71 
2018   41,031 330,085 9,359 379,464 86,336 32,576.10 
2019   46,658 331,360 9,359 431,498 60,090 21,148.16 
2020   53,058 328,591 9,359 490,685 27,407 8,996.84 
2021   57,321 320,820 9,359 530,107 4,418 1,352.76 
2022   57,321 309,206 9,359 530,107 3,021 862.88 
2023   57,321 296,622 9,359 530,107 1,165 310.46 
2024   57,321 282,986 9,359 530,107 -1,206 -299.68 
2025   57,321 269,752 9,359 530,107 -2,612 -605.44 
2026   57,321 255,591 9,359 530,107 -4,354 -941.28 
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2027   57,321 238,115 9,359 530,107 -8,790 -1,772.45 
2028   57,321 217,896 9,359 530,107 -15,317 -2,880.85 
2029   57,321 195,939 9,359 530,107 -22,897 -4,016.95 
2030   57,321 172,093 9,359 530,107 -31,647 -5,178.70 
2031   57,321 146,147 9,359 530,107 -41,743 -6,371.35 
2032   57,321 118,073 9,359 530,107 -53,174 -7,570.29 
2033   57,321 87,531 9,359 530,107 -66,241 -8,796.39 
2034   57,321 58,783 9,359 530,107 -76,640 -9,492.90 
Total 1,806,523 1,097,450 7,204,785 243,339 10,149,282 4,342,449 3,330,663 
Table 2: Calculation SBP of the Phu My project, with a 7.21 % discount rate 
 
 
Estimate of the PSC 
Cost items Value (million VNDs) 
Project capital cost  
Design and Construction contract price 1,395,148 
Acquisition of plant and equipment 45,247 
Administration cost during the construction 154,486 
Land acquisition 100,000 
Contingency cost 111,642 
Table 3: Basic assumptions applied to estimate PSC of the project (Source: T.V Hoang & X.N. Thanh 2013) 
 
 
Unit: million VNDs 
Year 
Raw PSC Transferred risk PSC 
Capital  
cost 
Management 
cost 
Maintenance 
cost 
Financing  
cost 
Revenue 
 
Overrun 
cost  
Traffic 
volume 
Nominal 
price 
NPV 
2005 745,778     64,137   54,704   931,811 858,022 
2006 446,955     38,438   42,268   608,515 515,954 
2007 359,279     30,898   35,224   528,980 413,000 
2008 254,510     21,888   14,336   439,798 316,180 
2009   7,370 48 155,361 49,132   5,381  95,090 62,949 
2010   8,338 48 155,361 55,587   5,381  79,601 48,522 
2011   9,458 48 155,361 63,053   5,381  51,804 29,077 
2012   10,697 48 155,361 71,312   5,381  25,910 13,392 
2013   12,096 48 155,361 80,637   5,381  -2,447 -1,164 
2014   13,721 48 155,361 91,471   5,381  -32,886 -14,412 
2015   15,561 48 155,361 103,743   5,381  -64,778 -26,140 
2016   17,934 9,648 155,361 119,560   5,381  -86,522 -32,149 
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2017   20,359 48 155,361 135,727   5,381  -167,075 -57,164 
2018   23,108 48 155,361 154,053   5,381  -231,168 -72,830 
2019   26,228 48 155,361 174,852   5,381  -307,661 -89,253 
2020   29,770 48 155,361 198,464   5,381  -398,954 -106,573 
2021   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -473,702 -116,519 
2022   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -505,155 -114,416 
2023   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -538,181 -112,244 
2024   32,098 9,648 155,361 213,986   5,381  -533,241 -102,406 
2025   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -609,269 -107,742 
2026   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -647,501 -105,435 
2027   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -687,644 -103,105 
2028   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -729,794 -100,759 
2029   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -774,052 -98,407 
2030   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -820,523 -96,054 
2031   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -869,317 -93,707 
2032   32,098 9,648 155,361 213,986   5,381  -862,017 -85,562 
2033   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  -974,346 -89,053 
2034   32,098 48 155,361 213,986   5,381  
-
1,030,832 -86,755 
Total 1,806,522 644,009 30,048 4,194,744 4,293,390 146,532 139,916 
-
8,585,558 445,246 
 Table 4: Net present value of PSC, with a 8.6% discount rate 
 
 
 
 
Computation of quantitative VFM 
     Unit: million VNDs 
Items            PSC (I)        SBP (II) 
Outflow (A) 1,776,950 5,985,326 
Inflow (B) 1,331,703 2,654,662 
Net present of cash flow (A) – (B) 445,246 3,330,663 
VFM (I) – (II) -2,885,417 
Table 5: Comparison of the Vietnamese government’s spending in the project of PPP scheme with traditional delivery 
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Figure 5: Comparison of the Vietnamese government’s spending in the project of PPP scheme with traditional 
delivery 
  
Figure 5 shows the spending of the government for the project under PPP and traditional procurement models. 
Conventional delivery is expected to have more spending savings for the government, especially from the years 
2016 to 2034 of the project cycle. As a result, quantitative VFM of the PPP model compared with the traditional 
procurement is -2,885,417 million VNDs. It implies traditional procurement is preferred to the PPP scheme to 
finance the Phu My project. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In order to guarantee the assessment is realistic, sensitivity analysis should be applied to compute the impact of 
movement in components of PSC on VFM. 
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Simple sensitivity analysis 
Figure 6 and 7 shows how movements in the cost components influence the project’s VFM. As presented in 
figure 6, VFM is more sensitive to movements in the capital cost than to movements in the management cost and 
maintenance cost. For example, when the capital cost of PSC influences 1%, quantitative VFM would be 
changed by 162,492 million VNDs. Meanwhile, every 1% movement in the maintenance cost creates 55 million 
VNDs. It means that VFM of the project is not sensitive to fluctuation in the maintenance cost. In addition to this, 
assuming the capital cost of the project implemented by public sector increases 15%, quantitative VFM is still 
negative. Thus, PPP model could not be preferred to conventional delivery to finance the Phu My project 
regardless of a 15% extra capital cost. As can be seen in figure 7, VFM has a positive sensitivity to changes in 
the discount rate, while is negative sensitivity to changes in inflation. 
In summary, compared to other cost variables, the fluctuation in the discount rate has a large effect on 
the VFM of the project, while the movement in the maintenance cost has a minimal impact on the VFM. If there 
is a 15% increase in the discount rate, the value of VFM is still negative. It supports the position that the 
decision to pursuit the PPP model is inappropriate regardless of a 15% extra discount rate or extra capital cost. 
 
Advanced sensitivity analysis 
The Monte Carlo simulation with an iteration of 10,000 times was performed to generate distributions of VFM 
for the project for the stochastic analysis. The @Risk 6.3 Palisade Software was used for running simulations. 
Figure 8 presents the distribution of the project’s VFM. The simulation result reveals that the mean of the VFM 
is -2,178,345 million VNDs and standard deviation is 1,366,517 million VNDs. In addition, the probability that 
quantitative VFM is negative is 95%. It implies that doing the project via PPP scheme is not a better solution 
than traditional government delivery. 
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis of the impact of 
cost components on VFM 
Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis of the impact of 
cost components on VFM 
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Figure 8: Distribution for the project's Value for money 
 
Figure 9: Sensitivity tornado graph for the VFM 
 
 Figure 9 shows the sensitivity tornado graph of the VFM. The larger the regression coefficient of an 
input variable, the more significant this variable impacts VFM. As shown in the graph, variables that have a 
larger impact on the value for money of the project are tolls, the inflation from 2016-2034, interest rates, and 
discount rates. In addition to this, all inputs except inflation from 2016-2034 and tolls have a positive influence 
on VFM. For example, a one standard deviation increase in toll would reduce VFM of the project by a 0.95 
standard deviation, which correspondents to 1,301,846 million VNDs. 
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Figure 10: Scatter graph of VFM versus toll 
 
Figure 10 shows the scatter graph of VFM and vehicle tolls. As can be seen, if the vehicle toll is less 
than 10,000 VNDs per PCU, there is only 5% confidence level that the PPP model could be more appropriate 
than conventional procurement. Alternatively, if the inflation from 2016-2034 is reduced from 5% to 1%, there 
is roughly a 2.7% chance that the PPP model could be better than the traditional government delivery (shown in 
figure 11) 
 
Figure 11: Scatter graph of VFM versus inflation 
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Conclusion 
The PPP scheme is not expected to be a better option than traditional delivery for the Phu My project. This is 
especially true if there is stochastic fluctuation in input parameters of PSC (inflation from 2016-2034, the toll, 
interest rate, items of project capital cost). In that case the probability of negative quantitative VFM of this 
project would be 95%. This demonstrates that the PPP model could not offer good value for the government 
with regard to the Phu My project. The decision making of the Vietnamese government to return the Phu My 
project from private investors to the public sector is rational. 
The case of the Phu My project could be a lesson for the Vietnamese government regarding the conduct 
of PPP projects. Without a VFM assessment before implementation, projects could lead to misguide decision-
making in the development of road transportation infrastructure. Once again, PPP is actually considered as a 
better alternative to traditional procurement if public sector understands clearly what benefits and drawbacks 
negotiation exist for private investors. One should not think that using a PPP model is only way to reduce state 
budget burdens that take out from the balance sheet of governments. Also, one should not tend to have such 
optimistic expectations on a PPP model to finance public projects. In order to prove whether a PPP is suitable 
procurement to support a given project, it is essential to conduct a value for money test. 
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